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WINKELMAN: PRO SE PARENTS OF
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN
THE COURTS (OR NOT?)
SONJA KERR*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, the Author examines the rights of parents to litigate pro se
on behalf of their children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA). The Author reviews Alaska and non-Alaska jurisprudence that
predates the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Winkelman v.
Parma City School District. The Author then examines the Winkelman
decision itself, as well as the impact of Winkelman on IDEA-related pro se
litigation. The Author notes the difficulties that parents continue to face in
IDEA-related litigation and concludes by proposing reforms designed to aid
parents in protecting the interests of children with disabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Alaska has a long and proud history of pro se litigation.1
Nevertheless, parents of children with disabilities have faced difficulties
when attempting to represent themselves and their children in court
proceedings seeking to protect the educational opportunities to which
the children are entitled under the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA).2 In May 2007, the United States Supreme Court
held, in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District,3 that
parents of children with disabilities have the right to represent
themselves in special education proceedings in federal courts.4 The
Court, however, reserved the question of whether parents could
represent their children in the same proceedings, focusing instead on the
parents’ right to proceed pro se to protect their own rights arising under
federal law.5 This Article examines the impact of Winkelman in Alaska,
where, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, at least two unrepresented
parents were prohibited from representing their children in the federal
courts.6 The Article also examines the policy implications of permitting
parents, some of whom may be disabled, to attempt to navigate through
the muddy waters of state and federal courts without counsel. The
Author hopes that this Article will foster a close examination of the
Winkelman issue in Alaska and other states, especially given the dearth
of special education attorneys throughout the United States.7
1. See, e.g., Breck v. Almer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006).
3. 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
4. Id. at 535.
5. Id.
6. See Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip
op. at 3 (D. Alaska Apr. 10, 2007); Hansen v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., No. A0600069 CV (TMB), slip op. at 3 (D. Alaska Apr. 19, 2006).
7. The United States Department of Education, Office of Special Education,
states that the IDEA serves approximately 6,800,000 children and youth with
disabilities. See United States Department of Education, Office of Special
Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/osep/index.html (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009). There are two common resources for parents to find special
education attorneys to assist them. The website of the Council of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) lists attorneys. COPAA estimates that it has
486 active attorney members with a total of 1,113 combined active and lapsed
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I. THE IDEA
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is a federal law that
funds state educational services for disabled children.8 States that accept
IDEA funding are obligated to identify students with disabilities and
ensure that each eligible student receives a “free appropriate public
education” (FAPE).9 The primary vehicle for delivering a FAPE is the
Individualized Education Program (IEP).10 An IEP is a document that
describes the student’s learning goals, as well as the services, strategies,
modifications, and accommodations that will be used to reach those
goals.11 Under the IDEA, school districts must develop and implement
IEPs meeting the unique educational needs of each eligible student.12
The IDEA strictly mandates parental involvement throughout the
development and implementation of a student’s IEP.13 This mandate is,
in large part, a result of the IDEA’s history. The IDEA was born as a
result of parental advocacy, particularly by those parents who, long
before most states allowed it, demanded that children with disabilities
be educated by public schools.14
Parents are critical members of the “IEP Team,” and the IDEA
intends that parents and schools work together to ensure the adequacy
of student services. Parents must, for example, be given written notice of
any changes a school district proposes for their child’s education
program.15 When the parents and the school cannot agree on an IEP’s
terms, the parents have a specific right to appeal the school’s proposed
program through an administrative hearing, often referred to as a “due
process” hearing.16 Dissatisfied parents can request an impartial due
process hearing to contest specific elements of an IEP, the denial of
requested services, or any other objectionable aspects of a proposed

attorney members. Email from Denise Marshall, Executive Director of COPAA,
to Sonja Kerr (Sept. 21, 2009) (on file with author). Each state does have a
federally mandated disability protection and advocacy office. See National
Disability Rights Network, http://www.napas.org. Only some of the offices
provide special education representation.
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006).
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191–93 (1982); Mills v. Bd.
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279, 281–82 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded
Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006).
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plan.17 A hearing examiner is empowered to determine whether a
proposed IEP satisfies the requirements of a FAPE, whether the changes
requested by the parents will be granted, and whether specific relief,
such as ordering private school placement, is appropriate.18
As the Alaska Supreme Court has pointed out, due process
hearings are “formal adjudicatory proceedings in which parents and
children have the rights to counsel, to present evidence, and to call,
confront, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”19 Due process
hearings are required to be expedited: once a parent asks for a hearing, a
hearing officer has forty-five days in which to issue a final, written
decision.20 Parents also have several other rights: the right to bring a
child to proceedings concerning the child; the right to an open, public
hearing; and the right to free copies of the decision and record.21
Notably, parents typically bear the burden of proof in the administrative
process, unless a school district, in the unusual instance, brings the
hearing.22 Additionally, the expenses of experts called by the parents are
not recoverable as a litigation cost.23
In short, these “due process hearings” are essentially full-blown
trials. By long-standing practice, parents can represent themselves in the
due process stage in every state and are permitted to be accompanied by
a lawyer or persons with special knowledge or training regarding
children with disabilities, known as “lay advocates.”24 These lay
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2006).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2006).
19. Bickford v. State, 155 P.3d 302, 304 (Alaska 2007).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2007). But see
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.K., 3:08-cv-00031 TMB, slip op. at 11 (D. Alaska Sept.
30, 2009) (holding that exceeding the forty-five day rule did not deprive the
hearing officer of jurisdiction).
21. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c) (2007).
22. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(i)(11) (2009). Some states do place
the burden of proof on the school district. Following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Schaeffer v. Murphy, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), some states changed the
burden of proof, placing it on parents; Alaska was one of those states.
23. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300
(2006).
24. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2007). Alaska has had no ruling on the use of lay
advocates as representatives at due process hearings, and there is no specific
Alaskan statute or rule on the subject. New Jersey Administrative Code 1:6A-4.2
permits lay advocates to represent parents in due process hearings. States,
however, have held that lay advocates may risk charges of unauthorized
practice of law if they charge parents for their work in due process hearings. See
Arons v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that
charging parents for services constitutes unauthorized practice of law). In some
states, the state provision permits representation without payment. In re Arons,
756 A.2d 867 (Del. 2000) (finding that Arons, a lay advocate, had engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law).
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advocates, however, must be very careful to avoid the unauthorized
practice of law, as courts have previously held in some instances that
parents seeking to use lay advocates were unable to represent
themselves.25
Once administrative processes have been exhausted, a parent who
remains dissatisfied has the right to file an appeal in federal district
court or state court. 26 In Alaska state court, a party may have as little as
thirty days to file an appeal.27 The decisions of the trial court may be
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, depending upon whether the IDEA claim was brought in state
or federal court.

II. RULES REGARDING PRO SE PLAINTIFFS IN ALASKA
Parents of students with disabilities, including those who have
represented themselves and their children in administrative forums,
may encounter barriers to representation at the appellate stage. In light
of these barriers, parents in Alaska should carefully consider which
court system they should utilize.
In Alaska state court, plaintiffs who file without legal
representation may be able to benefit from rules that are somewhat more
relaxed than the rules governing parties with attorneys. The Alaska
Supreme Court held, in Breck v. Almer,28 that “[t]he pleadings of pro se
litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of
lawyers.”29 The court elaborated that judges have a duty to inform a pro
se plaintiff of the “proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously
attempting to accomplish.”30 This holding has developed into a rule that
bars Alaska state court judges from dismissing unrepresented plaintiffs’
cases on technicalities.31 Instead, judges must ensure that unrepresented

25. Delaware’s highest court, for example, held that a parent who sought to
use a lay advocate was unable to represent herself. In re Machette, No. 239, 2004
WL 1535729, at *2 (Del. June 17, 2004).
26. 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a) (2007).
27. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.560(a) (2008).
The IDEA provides for ninety days to appeal, unless state law contains an
explicit time limitation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(b) (2007). It is not clear if Alaska has
an explicit time limitation, but if it does, the limit is thirty days from the date of
decision. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.560(a)
(2008).
28. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987).
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id.
31. See Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n, 64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003) (“It
is well settled that in cases involving a pro se litigant the superior court must
relax procedural requirements to a reasonable extent.”).
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plaintiffs are aware of the rules they need to follow and the procedures
that are available to them. Under this holding, the Alaska Supreme
Court has identified a variety of specific rules and procedures about
which judges must inform pro se plaintiffs. For example, a judge must
inform a plaintiff of his or her rights to file a reply to a defendant’s
answer and to defeat a defendant’s summary judgment motion by filing
opposing affidavits.32 Additionally, pro se plaintiffs should be informed
of the correct method for withdrawing admissions so that they do not
lose on summary judgment based on those admissions.33 Judges should
also inform unrepresented plaintiffs of deficiencies in their appellate
paperwork and provide them with opportunities to rectify the
problems.34 Further, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that
adjudicative officers of administrative agencies generally have the same
duties to pro se plaintiffs as state court judges.35 In spite of these and
other rulings, a judge’s obligations to a pro se plaintiff are case-specific.36
While the line of cases flowing from Breck does demonstrate that
pro se plaintiffs are afforded a degree of leniency in Alaska state courts,
this leniency is not without limits. In Bauman v. Division of Family and
Youth Services,37 the Alaska Supreme Court explained that while Breck
applied to unrepresented plaintiffs with defective motions, it did not
extend to unrepresented plaintiffs who failed to submit any motions.38
The court observed that the complicated nature of lawsuits is common
knowledge and that pro se plaintiffs must demonstrate some effort to
comply with procedural rules.39 Those rules were adopted to provide
fair and reasonable notice to all parties, and requiring judges to instruct
pro se plaintiffs at every step of the litigation could compromise their
neutrality.40 Alaska courts tend to balance the competing concerns of
Breck and Bauman when deciding whether a judge’s treatment of a pro se
plaintiff has been appropriate.41
32. Id.
33. Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 846–47 (Alaska 2003).
34. Dougan v. Aurora Elec. Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 795 (Alaska 2002).
35. Bohlmann v. Alaska Constr. & Eng’g, 205 P.3d 316, 320 (Alaska 2009).
36. See, e.g., Adkins v. Stansel, 204 P.3d 1031, 1033 (Alaska 2009) (stating that
judges should consider discernable pro se arguments if they are based on
established law and if consideration will not prejudice the opposing party);
Hymes v. Deramus, 119 P.3d 963, 966 (Alaska 2005) (trial judge has a duty to
inform pro se litigant of proper procedure for whatever the litigant is trying to
accomplish).
37. 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989).
38. Id. at 1099.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Snyder v. Am. Legion Spenard Post No. 28, 119 P.3d 996, 999–
1000 (Alaska 2005); Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998).
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Alaska courts have self-help assistance in other areas. Although
there is no direct self-help center for parents of children with disabilities,
there are general family law resources. For example, the Alaska
Supreme Court has a “Family Law Self-Help Center” that provides
explanations, forms, and classes on representing both oneself and one’s
children in family court proceedings.42 The website includes the SelfHelp Center’s toll-free number, which pro se litigants may call for
advice on procedures.43 It also includes explanations and examples of
general motion practice,44 trial preparation,45 and finishing a trial.46 This
material can provide background information for a pro se parent
attempting to appeal a special education matter. The Alaska courts also
have a general website on pro se representation in appeals of civil
matters.47 The website includes explanations of timelines, procedures,
and assistance available to those seeking to file or defend an appeal.48
In contrast, the federal district court in Alaska has generally been
less responsive to pro se litigants. The court does have an assistance
manual, “Representing Yourself in Alaska’s Federal Court,”49 though
individuals reading the manual are cautioned that the court staff cannot
assist any litigant and that the “same rules of practice and procedure”
apply as if the readers were represented by attorneys.50

III. ALASKA’S PRE-WINKELMAN CASES
Prior to the Winkelman decision, parents in Alaska attempted to
represent their children’s interests in both administrative and court
proceedings, and at least one parent previously litigated matters up to

42. Alaska Court System, Family Law Self-Help Center, http://www.state.
ak.us/courts/selfhelp.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
43. Id.
44. Alaska Court System, Motion Practice—Requesting an Order From the
Court, http://courts.alaska.gov/motions.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
45. Alaska Court System, Hearing and Trial Preparation, http://
courts.alaska.gov/shctrial.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
46. Alaska Court System, Finishing the Case: Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree and Judgment, http://courts.alaska.gov/
shcfinish.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
47. Alaska Court System, Self-Help Services: Appeals, http://www.courts.
alaska.gov/shc/appeals/appeals.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
48. Alaska Court System, Self-Help Services: Appeals—Forms and
Instructions for Civil Appeals, http://courts.alaska.gov/shc/appeals/
appealsins.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
49. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ALASKA, REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN
ALASKA’S FEDERAL COURT (THE PRO SE HANDBOOK) (2002), available at
http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/reference/pro_se/Pro_Se_Handbook.pdf.
50. Id. at 3.
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the Alaska Supreme Court.51 It does not appear that the Department of
Education or the Commissioner of Education in that case challenged her
right to litigate on behalf of her child. However, in two cases in federal
district court, the Anchorage School District did challenge the right of
the parents to proceed on behalf of their children, and the school district
was successful in both instances.
In Anchorage School District v. W.O ex rel. C.O.,52 a disabled student,
proceeding through his mother, prevailed at the administrative hearing
stage of the IEP process.53 The school district appealed the outcome in
federal court, naming the student as the defendant.54 The judge held that
the mother was not permitted to represent her son in the matter because
she was not an attorney.55 Recognizing that the mother had a potentially
meritorious claim but could not afford to pay an attorney, the judge
granted her motion for the appointment of volunteer counsel.56
However, the judge cautioned that granting the motion did not
guarantee that volunteer counsel would be found.57 He acknowledged
that in such a case, both the parents and the district would be in a catch22.58 The district had a right to appeal, yet it could not sue an
unrepresented minor.59 The child had a right to defend the outcome of
the hearings, but he could not lawfully do so without a lawyer.60
Ultimately, the issue in the case evaporated when the parents were
assisted by Alaska Legal Services Corporation.61 However, the W.O.
ruling sends a signal to parents: if they are successful in the
administrative forum, but unable to afford appellate counsel, they may
be able to avoid additional litigation because the school district will be
without recourse to proceed.
A similar case, Hansen v. Anchorage School District,62 involved a
father attempting to represent his disabled son in a civil complaint filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.63 The
51. Bickford v. State, 155 P.3d 302, 303 (Alaska 2007).
52. No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op. at 1 (D. Alaska Dec. 13, 2006).
53. Id. at *2.
54. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op.
at 1 (D. Alaska Apr. 10, 2007).
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3 n.10.
58. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op.
at 3 (D. Alaska Dec. 13, 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, Doc. 8,
Notice of Entry of Appearance (D. Alaska Apr. 24, 2007).
62. No. A06-00069 CV (TMB), slip op. at 1 (D. Alaska Apr. 19, 2006).
63. Id.
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complaint stated that he wished to “appeal a special education
matter.”64 The father also requested a waiver of the filing fee.65 In an
order denying these requests, the judge stated that unless the father was
himself an attorney, he could not represent his son in court.66 This was
because a litigant may act as his own counsel but may not represent
another individual.67 The judge recommended that the father contact the
Alaska Bar Association’s Lawyer Referral Service for assistance in
securing counsel.68 In order to avoid dismissal, the father would have to
file an amended complaint through an attorney and pay the filing fee.69
The case was later dismissed when the father failed to do so by the given
deadline.70

IV. NON-ALASKA PRE-WINKELMAN CASES
Prior to Winkelman, a body of case law had developed in courts
outside of Alaska. In these cases, both district and circuit courts were
deciding whether parents who had exhausted available administrative
remedies were barred from proceeding on behalf of their children in
federal court.
In Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District,71 the
parents of a disabled child proceeded without counsel in federal court
after exhausting all administrative remedies available to contest the IEP
that the school district had proposed for their son.72 The parents argued
that the IDEA abrogated the common law prohibition on non-lawyer
parents representing their children.73 The court disagreed on the
grounds that any statute, including the IDEA, must explicitly overturn
background legal principles; it cannot do so by implication, as the
parents had argued.74 The Cavanaugh court also rejected the notion that
parents had their own enforceable rights under the IDEA.75 It held that
substantive rights under the IDEA belong solely to students, and that
parents have only a narrow band of procedural rights.76 Thus, the
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Hansen v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-cv-00069-TMB, slip op. at 2 (D.
Alaska May 24, 2006).
71. 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005).
72. Id. at 755.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id. at 757.
76. Id.
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parents were required to furnish counsel for their child to avoid
dismissal of the claim.77
The Eleventh Circuit previously reached the same result in Devine
v. Indian River County School Board.78 In that case, the district court
denied a father’s motion to remove counsel and personally represent his
son in a lawsuit over a school’s proposed IEP.79 The circuit court
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that parents do not have a
right to represent their children in IDEA-related claims.80 It
acknowledged that the statute explicitly permits parents to do so during
administrative appeals, but it found no evidence that Congress intended
to extend that right to proceedings in district court.81
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar legal conclusion in Mosely v.
Board of Education,82 though the ultimate outcome of the proceedings was
notably different. In Mosely, a mother, acting without legal
representation, sued in federal court to challenge the treatment of her
disabled son.83 The district court judge dismissed the case for failure to
exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies.84 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit addressed the mother’s ability to represent her son in an IDEA
action in federal court.85 The court stated that “[t]he short answer . . . is
that she cannot [represent her son], unless she hires counsel.”86
However, the court recognized that parents’ rights under the IDEA give
them certain procedural interests.87 Based on these interests and the
specific factual allegations in the case, the court held that the mother
was suing for her own injuries.88 The court remanded the case and
explicitly authorized the mother to proceed pro se, though only on her
own behalf.89
However, the First Circuit interpreted matters differently, finding
that parents could proceed on behalf of their children. In Maroni ex rel.
Michael M. v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District,90 the parents of a
disabled student were dissatisfied with the IEP proposed by the child’s

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 757–58.
121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 535.
346 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003).
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school.91 After exhausting administrative remedies, the parents filed suit
in federal district court.92 The parents’ income exceeded the limits for
free legal assistance, and they stated that they could neither afford an
attorney nor find one who would take the case on a contingency basis.93
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the plaintiffs could not proceed on
their child’s behalf.94 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that parents are “aggrieved parties” under the IDEA regardless
of whether the underlying claim is procedural or substantive.95 Based
largely on the text of the IDEA, the court held that Congress intended
for parents to be able to vindicate their children’s rights under the Act.96
Requiring parents to secure counsel when they are unable to do so
would be inconsistent with this intent.97

V. THE WINKELMAN DECISION
The Winkelmans were the parents of a child diagnosed with an
autism spectrum disorder, a condition which qualified him for services
under the IDEA.98 The Winkelmans actively participated in the IEP
process, but they felt that the final IEP proposed by the school district
was inadequate for their son’s educational needs.99 At the parents’
request, impartial due process hearings were held—first before a
hearing officer, and then before a state-level review officer.100 Both
officers upheld the district’s proposed IEP as providing an adequate
FAPE for the Winkelmans’ son.101
As permitted by the IDEA, the Winkelmans filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio after
exhausting their administrative remedies.102 The complaint alleged that
the proposed IEP illegally denied a suitable FAPE.103 The Winkelmans
were not represented by counsel in their suit.104 The district court
granted summary judgment to the school district on the merits; the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250–51.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 519 (2007).
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 521.
Id.
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parents, again proceeding on behalf of their son, appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.105 Without reaching the merits of the case, the
Sixth Circuit entered an order to dismiss the claim unless the
Winkelmans secured counsel for their son.106 The court reasoned that
since the right to a FAPE belonged to the student and not to his parents,
the parents were not actually parties to the case, but had instead brought
the claim on behalf of their son.107 By a longstanding common law rule,
non-lawyer parents were prohibited from representing minor children,
so the parents could not proceed per se.108
The Sixth Circuit’s order was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the narrow issue of whether
parents may proceed pro se on IDEA claims in federal court.109 The
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that parents are
“entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”110 The Court
concluded that the IDEA bestows enforceable rights on parents,
independent of the rights bestowed on disabled students.111 It pointed
out that a comprehensive reading of the IDEA reveals that parental
rights are embedded throughout the IEP process, both as a safeguard for
students’ rights and in recognition of parents’ fundamental interests in
their children’s educations.112 Among the rights afforded to parents are
automatic membership on the IEP team, administrative remedies when
they disagree with the outcome of the IEP process, and the right to
reimbursement for various expenses.113 Although some circuits have
held that parents have only procedural rights and thus cannot proceed
pro se on substantive claims, the Supreme Court found that this position
led to incongruous results.114 It would permit some parents to vindicate
their children’s rights in federal court, while others would be required to
retain counsel.115
It should be noted that the Court did not overturn the common law
principle that non-lawyer parents may not represent minor children,
even in the context of IDEA cases. While this issue was raised in
Winkelman, the Court did not reach it.116 Instead, it found that non105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 528–31.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
See id. at 532–33.
Id. at 535.
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lawyer parents have their own claims under the IDEA and may bring
those claims pro se.117 The result is that parents’ personal claims relating
to their children’s eligibility for services under the IDEA will not be
dismissed because the children are not represented by counsel. The
IDEA bestows independent rights upon parents of disabled children,
allowing the parents to bring claims on a pro se basis.118
In Winkelman, the Supreme Court recognized that parental
involvement is a strong principle underlying the IDEA, as Congress
believed that parental involvement would enhance educational
prospects for disabled children.119 The IDEA is more effective if parents
have a meaningful opportunity to advocate for their children at every
stage of the process, including through pro se complaints in federal
court.120 However, while hailed as a victory for parents to proceed pro
se, it is not entirely clear whether the Court has limited that
representation to the parents or whether the parent is also permitted to
represent the child. The Court concluded that because the IDEA does
not differentiate between the rights accorded to children and those
accorded to parents, a parent may be an aggrieved party for purposes of
the IDEA with regard to any matter implicating those rights.121 At the
same time, it appears that the Court may have restricted parents’ rights
to advocating solely on their own behalf, and not on behalf of their
children.

VI. THE IMPACT OF WINKELMAN
Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Winkelman, parents of
children with disabilities can now represent themselves in federal and
state courts. This result is coherent and consistent with the significant
role that the IDEA has always afforded to parents of children with
disabilities. The first case examining the IDEA, Board of Education v.
Rowley,122 explained that: “[a]s this very case demonstrates, parents and
guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped
children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the
Act.”123 While the courts have continued to weigh in on the
interpretation of Winkelman, parents have maintained their fight to
represent not only themselves, but also their children.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 531.
458 U.S. 178 (1978).
Id. at 209.
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has twice ruled on the issue of
parental representation after Winkelman. In Muse B. ex rel. Hanna B. v.
Upper Darby School District,124 the court interpreted Winkelman as
allowing parents to represent themselves pro se because under the
IDEA, parents’ substantive rights are not limited to procedural and
reimbursement-related matters.125 The Third Circuit reasoned that
parents have the right to prosecute actions on their own behalf, and thus
an appeal filed by parents in an IDEA case should not be dismissed for
lack of counsel.126 According to the Third Circuit, “the Supreme Court
reasoned that the IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for
each child with a disability, with parents playing a significant role in this
process.”127 Further, since “parents enjoy enforceable rights at the
administrative stage . . . it would be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal
court.”128 The Third Circuit went on to state that the Supreme Court has
expressly reserved the question of whether the IDEA entitles parents to
litigate their children’s claims without the assistance of counsel.129
Accordingly, it held that, under Winkelman, parents may litigate pro se
in federal court with regard to their IDEA rights to challenge the
substantive adequacy of their children’s FAPEs.130
In Woodruff v. Hamilton Township Public Schools,131 the Third Circuit
further clarified that parents cannot represent their children in every
issue being litigated, even if one of the claims is under the IDEA.132 The
parents in Woodruff filed pro se claims in federal district court on behalf
of themselves and their child.133 The Woodruffs brought claims for
violations of the IDEA, as well as various state law, due process, and
common law claims.134 The district court concluded that Winkelman does
not grant parents the right to litigate non-IDEA claims on their
children’s behalf.135 After the Woodruffs filed an amended complaint
purportedly containing only their own claims, the district court
dismissed the alleged injuries as insufficiently personal.136 On appeal,
124. 282 Fed. App’x 986 (3d Cir. 2008).
125. Id. at 990.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007)).
128. Id. (quoting Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 526) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 305 Fed. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2009).
132. Id. at 836.
133. Id. at 835.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 835–36.
136. Id. at 836.
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the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, concluding that “Winkelman
does not translate into a broad right to pursue any statutory or common
law claims on a child’s behalf. With the exception of an IDEA action on
their own behalf, the Woodruffs may not represent [their child] in the
federal courts in this circuit.”137
Similarly, in J.R. v. Sylvan Union School District,138 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California concluded that
Winkelman limits parents’ pro se representation to representing only
themselves.139 The court drew a careful distinction, noting that
Winkelman enables plaintiff parents “to pursue their IDEA claims
without counsel,” but does not recognize a right to pursue non-IDEA
claims on behalf of their children.140 The court cited the general rule that
“a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child
without retaining a lawyer.”141 According to J.R., only where the rights
of the child and parents are coterminous can the parents pursue, on their
own behalf, the claims they share with their child.142
Parents of children with disabilities clearly have the “right” to
represent themselves pro se in the courts. Yet, it appears unlikely at this
juncture that courts will allow them to represent their children in
matters relating to the children’s substantive rights. As a policy matter,
without the right to represent their children in regard to substantive
rights, parents may not have the ability or resources to protect those
rights. As a result, the children’s underlying claims may be permanently
lost.

VII. THE FUTURE OF IDEA LITIGATION
Federal and state courts can be a labyrinth of confusing procedures
and practices. Even experienced attorneys can make errors that have
critical implications for cases. How, then, are parents supposed to
navigate these systems? Parents are unlikely to simply retreat or give up
on advocating for their children, and they will continue to make efforts
to represent themselves and their children in seeking to obtain the
137. Id. (citing Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d
876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991)).
138. No. CIV S-06-2136 LKK GGH PS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18168 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2008).
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Johns, the Ninth Circuit wrote that
where minors “have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained
legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected. ” Johns, 114 F.3d at 877.
142. J.R., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18168, at *4.
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education to which their children are lawfully entitled. As explained by
the Department of Justice’s amicus brief in the Winkelman case, the rights
of parents and the rights of children under the IDEA are intermixed and
interrelated; separation of these rights is difficult due to the interlocking
nature of the rights conferred by the IDEA.143 Courts in each state need
to reexamine their own procedures and the processes in light of
Winkelman.
We know that many states, including Alaska, have developed “selfhelp” programs and assistance in other types of law (for example, family
law). Alaska has a well-developed “self-help” program that guides
individuals through divorce and custody processes. The same type of
assistance should be made available to parents who wish to represent
themselves and their children with disabilities, whether in special
education hearings, federal court, or state court. Without such a process,
parents will likely stumble and their children’s rights will be left
unprotected.
Alaska has approximately 19,000 of this country’s 6,800,000
children with disabilities.144 There are simply not enough lawyers to
assist even the small percentage of parents who need representation in
order to fully protect their own rights and their children’s rights under
the Winkelman standard. This problem is not unique to Alaska, but is
evident throughout the United States, where fewer than five hundred
lawyers practice exclusively in the area of special education law.145

143. See, e.g., Brief of the Equal Justice Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,
550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3735956; Brief of Council of Parent Attorneys and
Advocates Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3740368; Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex
rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3740370 at
*6–7, nn.2–3.
144. DEP’T OF EDUC. AND EARLY DEV., STATE OF ALASKA, REPORT CARD TO THE
PUBLIC 2 (2008), available at http://www.eed.state.ak.us/reportcard/20072008/reportcard2007-08.pdf. This report reflects an average daily membership of
128,975 students with 14.8% in special education, which is approximately 19,088.
Id.
145. The Author was the only full-time private attorney specializing in special
education in Alaska. According to the listings on the website of the Council of
Parent Attorneys and Advocates, http://www.copaa.net, this is not a unique
phenomenon. COPAA’s membership is about 1200, including approximately 500
attorneys, with the remainder being parents and lay advocates. Each state does
have a federally mandated disability protection and advocacy office. National
Disability Rights Network, History, http://www.napas.org/aboutus/history.
htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). However, only some of these offices provide
special education services.
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With the Winkelman decision, it is critical that states, including
Alaska, develop ways to help parents navigate administrative and court
systems. Each state is responsible for creating ways to train parents and
provide them with information about their rights and how to protect
those rights. Yet only a few states have begun the process of developing
manuals or training materials for parents who want to represent
themselves. Pennsylvania, for example, is in the process of developing a
special education hearing manual for parents who wish to represent
themselves, but even this manual is primarily limited to the proceedings
on the administrative level.146
The IDEA’s administrative proceedings, as well as the court
appeals based on those proceedings, were originally designed to be
parent-friendly. They were also designed to allow parents to speak on
behalf of themselves and their children. However, the appeals from
those proceedings have become procedurally and substantively
complicated. Courts, legislatures, the Federal Office of Special Education
Programs, and the United States Congress should examine this problem
by convening a national taskforce on the issue. The taskforce would
examine: (1) the resources parents need to represent themselves and
their children adequately in due process hearings and in the courts; (2)
the availability of a process whereby, similar to juvenile court, children
with disabilities will have “educational” public defenders to fight for
their rights free of charge; and (3) the repercussions if children with
disabilities are left without recourse if their parents cannot afford an
attorney, as well as how a child’s claims will be lost at the appellate
stage if parents cannot afford counsel and the child’s claims are found to
be separate from, and not coterminous with, the parents’ claims.

CONCLUSION
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Winkelman, states may see
an increase in pro se representation by parents, both in federal court and
in due process hearings. Yet, those same parents may not be able to
represent their own children in federal district court if an appeal is taken
by either side, leaving the child without recourse and both parties
without a fair resolution.
The purpose of the IDEA will be best served if this problem is
addressed directly as a policy matter, rather than leaving parents of
146. OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL (2009), available at http://odr.pattan.net/files/
ODR/SEDR_Man.pdf; cf. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF PA., PRO SE
PACKAGE: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO FILING A CIVIL ACTION (2006), available at
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/PROSEman.pdf.
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these 6,800,000 children with disabilities to scramble and scratch their
way through the labyrinth of various legal systems. No one wins if one
party is not adequately represented, particularly where the educational
needs of a child are at stake. A national taskforce must be convened to
examine the problem caused by the lack of representation for the very
children that the IDEA is designed to serve. If a child’s parents cannot
represent them, parents and schools need to know who will. The
taskforce must ultimately decide whether to amend the statute to permit
parents to represent their children as well as themselves, or to provide
specific funding to ensure that parents and children are sufficiently
represented by lawyers or lay advocates at all levels of litigation.

